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I. INTRODUCTION
As the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) turns seventy-
five, it finds itself under the heaviest criticism of its history. The current
credit crisis has prompted cries and proposals for wholesale review of
the United States' financial regulatory quilt,' which renders the SEC
particularly vulnerable. Will the SEC survive, and if so, will it have a
more circumscribed role regulating U.S. capital markets than it has held
in the past? Its vulnerability in the face of these questions is not because
of the agency's actions, but rather its glaring inactions.
The financial frauds revealed in 2001 and 2002-the prior financial
maelstrom-were not blamed on the SEC, but on gaps in the financial
reporting process. Congress moved quickly to strengthen both the
financial reporting process and the SEC's ability to monitor the
truthfulness of financial reports. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
(SOX) 2 was key to this effort. It strengthened the self-regulatory
organizations that not only established the metrics of accounting
standards 3 but also oversaw the auditing profession. 4  Numerous other
provisions in SOX required the SEC to expand the scope of financial
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grateful for the research assistance of Messrs. Jonas Anderson, Benjamin Baucom, and Randy Clark.
1. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW FOUNDATION:
REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION (2009), http://www.financialstability.gov
/docs/regs/FinalReport web.pdf (setting forth a wide range of proposals for augmenting and, to some
extent, consolidating regulatory authority for various government agencies). Proposals of the preceding
Administration are set forth in U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED
FINANCIAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE (2008), http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/Blueprint.pdf.
2. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat.745 (codified in scattered
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
3. See id. § 108 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77s (2006)) (amending Section 19 of the
Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74, and requiring that authoritative accounting standards
acceptable in SEC filings must, among other factors, be via a private entity funded through fees
collected by the SEC from accountants and registrants).
4. See id. §§ 101-107 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7211-17) (establishing the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board, a self-regulatory organization funded by fees collected by the
SEC from accountants and registrants, charged with the responsibility of establishing and enforcing
auditing standards for SEC registrants, and operating under the oversight of the SEC).
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reporting5 as well as improve the timeliness of public disclosures.6
And, a cornerstone of SOX was the long-overdue deferred maintenance
of internal controls for reporting companies, which now is addressed
through the annual certifications by companies' senior officers 7 and
accompanying attestation of their assessment by the outside auditors.8
New laws were not the only answer. Congress also invested in the
SEC, nearly doubling its budget over two years. This gave the SEC the
capacity to review public companies' filings more frequently, and
increased the chances of avoiding the next Enron. Moreover, Congress
dealt with the diaspora of senior SEC personnel9 into the private sector
by approving several hundred positions for above-grade compensation
so the agency could retain its most senior and talented employees with
compensation that rivaled the generous compensation long paid by the
Federal Reserve Bank. 10
The current crisis is not the product of financial reporting abuses.
Much of the crisis is in sectors of the financial community well beyond
the SEC's reach. The problems flow from the portfolios of insurance
companies, commercial banks, and hedge funds--each of which are, at
best, tangentially within the purview of the SEC's regulation. To be
sure, these portfolios were infected with toxic securities, but this largely
occurred in transactions that were exempted from securities laws when
the portfolios were registered with the SEC. Indeed, the problem that
continues to grip financial institutions is not the historical concern of
disclosure, but their avaricious pursuit of gain through excessive
5. See, e.g., id. § 401(a) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78m) (amending Section 13(j) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881, and calling upon the SEC to require greater
disclosure of material off-balance sheet transactions); id. § 401(b) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 7261(b)) (calling for the SEC to develop collateral disclosure requirements for "pro forma" financial
information appearing in reports filed with the SEC).
6. See, e.g., id. § 403(a) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78p) (amending Section 16(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act, accelerating the disclosures for trading by officers, directors, and certain
beneficial owners of reporting companies); id. § 409 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78m)
(amending Section 13(1), enabling the SEC to compel disclosures of material items in plain English on a
rapid and current basis); see also SEC Form 8-K, http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form8-k.pdf (calling
for prompt disclosure of entering into or terminating a "material definitive agreement," and disclosure
related to the creation or acceleration of a material financial obligation).
7. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7241);
Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.307-308 (2009) (requiring such disclosures in annual reports in SEC
Form 10-K, Item 9A for large accelerated filers).
8. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 404 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7262).
9. See generally James D. Cox, Randal S. Thomas & Dana Kiku, SEC Enforcement Heuristics:
An Empirical Inquiry, 53 DUKE L. J. 737, 751-53 (2002) (reviewing the resource constraints the SEC has
faced while confronting a rapidly growing workload).
10. See Investor and Capital Markets Fee Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 107-123, § 8, 115 Stat. 2390
(2002) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78d).
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leverage. And it is on this point that the SEC is vulnerable-not because
of errors of commission, but omission. The SEC did nothing to address
excessive leveraging, except defer to the self-preservation instincts of
financial holding companies not to excessively leverage. 1" Because its
trust was misplaced, the SEC now stands before the audience of public
opinion as an emperor without clothes.
This Article suggests the SEC's disrobing is from its failure to
understand the true strengths and successes that have distinguished it
through its seventy-five year history. As it survives its latest crisis and
moves into the new era, it can draw guidance and strength from past
successful strategies, reviewed below.
II. FRAMEWORK FOR SURVIVAL
It is worth asking how the SEC has survived while many other
independent regulatory agencies have perished. 12 A key feature of the
SEC, and its sister regulatory agencies, is the broad rulemaking authority
Congress enshrined in its legislative mandate. Congress correctly
anticipated that as times changed, so could the medium and content of
financial disclosures. In 1996 Congress enhanced the SEC's broad
rulemaking power when it conferred broad authority to the SEC to
provide exemptions in each major act it administers. 13
But broad, enabling powers are not the sole source of the SEC's
longevity. An independent regulatory agency's durability is also largely
determined by politics. The SEC has benefited terrifically from its
structure, which balances politics by requiring that no more than three of
its sitting commissioners be members of the same political party. 4
Even more important, historically the SEC's mission has been to protect
investors and strengthen capital markets; this mission is not as
politically loaded as those of rival administrative agencies.' 
5
Emerging public issues threaten the SEC's politically neutral mission
11. See Stephen Labaton, Agency's '04 Rule Let Banks Pile Up New Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3,
2008, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/l0/03/business/03sec.html.
12. See David E. Lewis, The Politics of Agency Termination: Confronting the Myth of Agency
Immortality, 64 J. POL. 89, 92-93 (2002) (noting 62% of agencies created since 1946 were terminated by
1997).
13. See National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, §§ 105,
209, 407, 110 Stat. 3416 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-3, 78mm, 80b-5, 80a-6) (amending
Securities Act of 1933, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Investment Advisers Act of 1940, and
Investment Company Act of 1940).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2006).
15. See Donald C. Langevoort, Commentary, Stakeholder Values, Disclosure, and Materiality,
48 CATH. U. L. REV. 93, 97 (1998) (attributing SEC's success and no doubt durability to having an
apolitical agenda).
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and, consequently, endanger its survival. Indeed, the SEC's present
agenda invariably calls on the agency to take a position on issues that
transcend disclosure and fairness in capital markets. One example
reveals how the SEC's involvement in political issues can imperil its
survival. A few years ago, the SEC's proposal that in extremely limited
instances shareholders be permitted to nominate individuals for election
to a company's board of directors provoked nearly 17,000 responses,
mostly from company executives. 16  Related to this was the strongly
partisan reaction to the Republican-controlled SEC's decision not to
abide by the Second Circuit's narrow construction of SEC Rule 14a-8;
the Second Circuit had rejected the SEC's position that a proposed
bylaw authorizing shareholders to nominate directors was outside the
scope of the SEC's shareholder proposal rule. 17 Though it lost that legal
battle, the SEC proposed an amended rule that expressly excluded such a
proposal. 18 Following a change in Administrations, the new Democratic
chair proposed even broader authority for shareholder nominating
proposals than the proposed regulation that had ignited the earlier
firestorm among company executives. 19
The growing institutionalization of stockholdings and increasing
malaise in some financial institutions regarding management
prerogatives-such as compensation, takeover defenses, or acquisition
strategies-suggest that the SEC will be drawn into non-neutral political
issues. This politicization seems inevitable and will necessarily
jeopardize the bipartisan support the SEC has long enjoyed.
The SEC may find a recipe for addressing this problem in its
approach to the 1970s revelations in connection with Watergate and
massive bribery and illegal campaign contributions by public
companies. Although the SEC threatened enforcement actions against
companies that did not comply with its announced amnesty program, the
issue shifted from the SEC to Congress via hearings leading to the
16. See Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 48626, 81 SEC
Docket 770 (Oct. 14, 2003) (among the triggering events was the failure of the board of directors to
institute a proposal that had earlier garnered the support of a majority of the stockholders); JOHN C.
BOGLE, THE BATTLE FOR THE SOUL OF CAPITALISM 90 (2005) (observing there were 17,000 responses
to the shareholder nomination proposal).
17. See Am. Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees v. Am. Int'l Group, Inc., 462 F.3d 121,
123 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that a proposal focused on amending the bylaws to empower stockholders
meeting certain criteria to nominate directors does not pertain to the election of a director).
18. See Am. Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees v. Am. Int'l Group, Inc., 462 F.3d 121,
123 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that a proposal focused on amending the bylaws to empower stockholders
meeting certain criteria to nominate directors does not pertain to the election of a director).
19. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Securities Act Release No. 9046, 2009
WL 1953653 (June 10, 2009).
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Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977.20 Similarly, issues at the core of
the public's concern regarding management prerogatives versus
stockholder rights and protection are of sufficient significance to attract
not just hearings, but possibly Congressional authority permitting the
21SEC to act. Currently the SEC engages this battle through its
shareholder proposal rule, but this provision lacks express Congressional
approval and when initially adopted was never envisioned as the
battleground between activist investors and management. Legitimizing
the appropriateness of shareholder access to the proxy machinery, and
even the nominating process, by legislation would not just clothe the
SEC with authority to superintend national policy, but would establish a
national position on shareholder rights in public companies. This likely
would remove suggestions that the SEC has lost its virtue (not to
mention, political necessity) as a neutral guardian of shared policies.
III. THE ORACLE OF THE INDUSTRY
The 1960 election of President John F. Kennedy ushered in a much
needed rejuvenation of the SEC.22 In the preceding decade the agency
had slipped into disrepair, from the widely shared view that the SEC was
the gem among President Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal independent
regulatory agencies. A major part of the agency's reinvigoration was a
special studies program carried out under its auspices.
The 1963 Special Study of the Securities Markets (Special Study)
questioned the effectiveness of self-regulation and the various
exchanges' commitment to protect investors. The study also took
particular aim at the brokerage industry's unyielding support for fixed
brokerage commissions and the prevalent practice of floor traders
accentuating trends in securities prices.23  The Special Study spawned
numerous corrective steps, such as the first SEC regulations and later
Congressional action abolishing fixed brokerage commissions,24
20. Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977) (prohibiting registrant employees from bribing
government officials as well as introducing adequate accounting records requirement).
21. See H.R. 1664, 111th Cong. (2009) (as passed by House, Apr. 1, 2009) (calling for
nonbinding approval by stockholders of executive compensation); S. 1074, 111 th Cong. (2009) (Sen.
Charles Schumer's "Shareholder Bill of Rights Act of 2009").
22. JAMES BURK, VALUES IN THE MARKETPLACE: THE AMERICAN STOCK MARKET UNDER THE
FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW 103-05 (1992) (recounting how the SEC's budget was drastically reduced
during the Eisenhower Administration and the Kennedy Administration revived the agency with an
infusion or resources).
23. See generally 2 JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 333
(2002) (discussing composition and findings of those carrying out the Special Study).
24. The SEC's action with respect to fixed commission rates occurred in stages via Exchange
Act Rule 19b-3. See Adoption of Securities Exchange Act Rule 19b-3, Exchange Act Release No.
20091 463
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restricting floor trading, 25 and amending the Securities Exchange Act to
incorporate large over-the-counter traded companies in the periodic
disclosure requirements. 
26
Equally significant was the so-called 1962 Wharton Report, which
comprehensively reviewed the mutual fund industry.27 The report
cataloged the absence of arms-length dealings between fund managers
and mutual funds, as well as numerous abuses flowing from this tight
relationship. Most significantly, the Wharton Report found that mutual
fund advisory fees were substantially higher than fees the same advisors
charged their non-fund clients and that substantial portions of the
difference in fees so charged could not be attributed to economies of
scale posed by their non-fund clients or the additional services that
advisors provided to their advised funds.2 8 The Wharton Report,
drawing from insights also provided by the Special Study, ultimately led
to the Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission on the Public
Policy Implications on Investment Company Growth.29 Years later, the
reports drove Congress to amend the Investment Company Act to
introduce a fiduciary standard for the annual approval of fund's
advisor's contract.
The Special Study and Wharton Report reveal the important role
thoughtful and thorough information gathering regarding discrete
aspects of financial markets can play in the formulation of public
policy.31  This also argues that commissioning studies to assess the
efficient and safe functioning of U.S. capital markets should be an
important ongoing, not episodic, function of the SEC. While an agency
may not be able to stay ahead of industry practices through timely
regulatory developments, it is reasonable to assume that the SEC can
11,203, 6 SEC Docket 147 (Jan. 23, 1975), rescinded by Rescission of Rules Under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 26,180, 42 SEC Docket 4 (Oct. 14, 1988).
Congress's actions occurred in connection with its 1975 amendments to the Securities Exchange Act.
See Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (codified in scattered sections
of 26 U.S.C.).
25. See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 333 (2d ed. 1995).
26. Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, 78 Stat. 565; see also SELIGMAN,
supra note 25, at 321-22.
27. See IRwN FRIEND ET AL., WHARTON SCH. OF FIN. AND COMMERCE, A STUDY OF MUTUAL
FUNDS, H.R. REP. No. 87-2274 (1962).
28. See SELIGMAN, supra note 25, at 366-71.
29. H.R. REP. NO. 89-2337 (1966).
30. See Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1413
(codified in scattered sections of 15 and 26 U.S.C.).
31. For an interesting retrospective on the Special Study by some of those who participated in the




assess where industry practices and how they may impact the public
interest. Thus, it is appropriate for significant agency resources to be
deployed to an office tasked with proposing, designing, sponsoring, and
carrying out comprehensive studies of industry and market practices and
determining whether regulatory action is necessary.
While admittedly second-guessing, it would have likely have been
revealing in the post Gramm-Leach-Bliley 32 era to have studied the
operational changes of broker-dealers as many of them were engulfed
within large financial conglomerates and shifted their profit centers from
the provision of services to clients to their own trading desks. We likely
would have learned a lot had this been among the SEC's foci. We now
have a similar opportunity.
IV. FIRST, RID US OF THE LAWYERS
Four decades ago Professor Homer Kripke sharply criticized the SEC
for its technocratic culture, which he largely attributed to being over-
lawyered.33 The SEC's staff, then and now, is in stark contrast to the
individuals its first chairman recruited. Joseph Kennedy came from
Wall Street and brought large numbers of individuals from Wall Street
to the SEC. He and John Landis, the agency's third chairman, set much
of Wall Street at ease by not only surrounding themselves with brokers,
analysts, and accountants, but by overtly seeking the regulated's
participation in the SEC's mission.34 The symbiotic relationship persists
in many quarters of the SEC's activities, despite the heavier presence of
lawyers today than then. But, while the relationship is symbiotic, it is
not likely to be as attuned to the public interest as it could be if the
SEC's personnel had a wider set of skill packages.
Before the credit crisis in 2008, regulated parties insisted that SEC
32. See Graham-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) (essentially repealing the Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89,48 Stat. 162).
33. HOMER KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN SEARCH OF A
PURPOSE 4, 18-20 (1979).
34. See SELIGMAN, supra note 25, at 106-11 (describing the members of the Wall Street
community that Joseph Kennedy recruited to the SEC); THOMAS K. MCCRAw, PROPHETS OF
REGULATION 186-90 (1984) (describing Landis' belief that it was wiser to work through existing private
structures and professionals rather than to confront them and his successful efforts of convincing the
accounting profession that the SEC regulation was a benefit for them). These perspectives led naturally
to the Maloney Act of 1938, which among other features, established the self-regulatory organization for
broker-dealers that continues today. See generally JOHN 0. MATHEWS, STRUGGLE AND SURVIVAL ON
WALL STREET: THE ECONOMICS OF COMPETITION AMONG SECURITIES FIRMS 46 (1994) (detailing how
early focus of self-regulation was on fraudulent and manipulative practices but not anti-competitive
practices such as fixed commission rates).
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regulations should be both principle-based and prudential.35 In a sense,
these each connote the same meaning: the SEC's role was to discretely
nudge the regulated toward broadly shared goals rather than institute
enforcement actions for violating announced directives. The paradigm
of this new order was the United Kingdom's Financial Services
Administrator, whose staff reflected the background and culture of the
regulated and was distinctly not lawyer or enforcement oriented.
The SEC has attempted principles-based regulation. For example, its
recent Compensation Disclosure and Analysis (CD&A) program
contribution to the annual reports filed with the SEC is principles
based.36 In its first year, many companies adhered to the spirit of the
CD&A, but significant numbers did not. The SEC's experience with
CD&A rivals its ongoing problems with the analogous Management
Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) portion of registrants' reports, 37
where the SEC's constant lament is that significant numbers of issuers
do not comply with the required disclosure of existing conditions that
pose a reasonable prospect for a favorable or adverse impact.38 While
there are rare enforcement actions brought for failure to comply with the
MD&A's requirements, 39 the SEC's primary response is a few releases
chiding companies for not complying with disclosure requirements.
This may well be prudential regulation at its zenith.
A far wiser response would be to inquire into the backgrounds of
those who review the filings or other compliance-related issues that
confront the SEC. Advisors, broker-dealers, and others engaged in
trading and advisory services are better monitored by individuals whose
education, training, and experience are similar to the activities they
review. We can only speculate whether the fraudster of the century,
Bernard Madoff, whose $50 billion Ponzi scheme continues to shake
40 Ahv 1investor confidence in regulators, would have been uncovered earlier
35. See, e.g., COMM. ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMM. ON
CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION (2006), http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs
/1 1.30CommitteeInterimReportREV2.pdf.
36. See Instructions to Item 402(b) of Regulation S-K, 17 CFR § 229.402(b) (2009); see also
SEC, Div. of Corp. Fin., Staff Observations in the Review of Executive Compensation Disclosure (Oct.
9, 2007), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/execcompdisclosure.htm.
37. Item 303 of Regulation S-K, 17 CFR § 229.303.
38. See, e.g., Commission Guidance Regarding Management's Discussion and Analysis of
Financial Condition and Results of Operations, Exchange Act Release No. 8350, 81 SEC Docket 2905
(Dec. 19, 2003) (providing guidance regarding MD&A disclosure, and stating the SEC's belief and
expectation that such disclosure will improve).
39. See, e.g., In re Coca-Cola Co., Exchange Act Release No. 51565, 85 SEC Docket 601 (Apr.
18, 2005).
40. See Michael Lewis & David Einhorn, Op-Ed, The End of the Financial World as We Know
It, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2009, at WK 9.
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had the SEC staff inspecting his operation had the toolkit similar to the
whistle blower4 1 that prompted the SEC's single visit to Madoff's
advisory operations.
Staffing the SEC with individuals with the appropriate background
would uncover problems earlier and be more effective than training and
experience that better equip an individual for enforcement rather than
inspection efforts. As the SEC moves forward, the Commission should
mesh its staff's skill set with its regulatory mandate.
V. CONFRONTING GLOBALIZATION
Ultimately, the credit crisis will relent and no longer dominate, as it
does now, regulators' agenda. Globalization of trading in, and offerings
of, securities will persist and dominate regulators' agenda. U.S.
investors are acquiring increasing amounts of foreign securities. U.S.
holdings of foreign securities in 1990 was $197.6 billion, surged to
$1.85 trillion in 2000, and stood at $2.97 trillion in 2005, when foreign
holdings of U.S. companies was $2.3 trillion.42 Stated differently,
nearly two-thirds of all U.S. investors hold foreign securities in their
portfolios. 43  U.S. acquisition of foreign securities occurs in foreign
markets because the once-hardy trend of foreign issuers offering or
listing their securities in the United States has slowed to a trickle. To be
sure, foreign initial public offerings (IPOs) in 2006 accounted for 16%
of the number (and 23% of the offering amount) of IPO's conducted in
the United States, but the trend appears to be against the U.S. market, as
foreign markets have become more trustworthy such that the U.S. listing
premium has shrunk. 4
41. See Gregory Zuckerman & Kara Scannell, MadoffMisled SEC in '06, Got Off, WALL. ST. J.,
Dec. 18, 2008, at AI (detailing the efforts of Mr. Markopolos to bring to the SEC his concerns that Mr.
Madoff was engaged in defrauding investors).
42. SEC. INDUS. ASS'N, SECURITIES INDUSTRY FACTBOOK 2006, at 81 (2006). This figure does
not capture the full story as it reflects only securities holdings. Including purchases and sales of
securities, i.e., trading, U.S.-based investors racked up $7.5 trillion in transactions for 2005.
43. See Eric J. Pan, Single Stock Futures and Cross-Border Access for U.S. Investors, 14 STAN.
J. L. BUS. & FIN. 221, 230 (2008) (stating that this figure rose from about 50% in 1999).
44. At least one group marshals statistics to support the claim that the U.S. markets have lost
their competitive position. See COMM. ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, THE COMPETITIVE
POSITION OF THE U.S. PUBLIC EQUITY MARKET 23 (2007),
http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/The.-CompetitivePosition-of-the-US-PublicEquity Market.pdf
(citing statistics of the slowing rate of growth in market capitalizations of U.S. markets in 2002-2007
versus 1990-2002, whereas worldwide market capitalizations have grown at twice the U.S. rate in
2002-2007). Certainly U.S. equity markets have shrunk in terms of
the amount they make up of all equity markets. See Deepak Gopinath, IPOs Shun U.S. Exchanges While
Wall Street Collects Record Fees, BLOOMBERG, Feb. 20, 2007,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&refer=home&sid=aFO7NNgeuzc (equities of
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Historically, securities regulation was a much simpler activity. In a
less globalized world, capital markets were balkanized so that each
country's regulatory focus was local. This was particularly true in the
United States, since the gap in quality between U.S. markets and its
nearest rivals was so great that regulatory competition was not a
concern; there was no competition among national markets. The above
statistics document that this is no longer the case, and as such, the SEC
understands that it is an important but no longer dominant regulator.
Stated simply, for several years the SEC has been ensnared by the
tsunami of globalization.
Several recent SEC initiatives can only be understood by considering
how intimate the space has become within world capital markets. In this
context, the overarching strategy has been that of mutual recognition.
To the cynic, this reflects the regulator's perspective that "if you can't
beat them, join them." A more supportive view of mutual recognition is
that it is an efficient solution for coping with the reality that rival
markets are converging toward American reporting and operational
practices.45 That is, differences between U.S. and foreign regimes are so
slight that true convergence between them is not necessary to assure
investor protection.
A dramatic embrace of mutual recognition occurred in late 2007 when
the SEC lifted its seventy-five year requirement that foreign issuers
reconcile their financial reports with generally accepted U.S. accounting
principles (U.S. GAAP).46 And, the SEC earlier announced it might
permit domestic firms to prepare their financial statements in accordance
with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) rather than U.S.
GAAP.47 Additionally, in fall 2008 the SEC placed the death of U.S.
GAAP, at least for securities disclosures, on the agenda by proposing
U.S. companies in 2007 accounted for 37% of all global market capitalization versus 50% in 2001).
45. See generally Ethiopis Tafara & Robert J. Peterson, A Blueprint for Cross-Border Access to
U.S. Investors: A New International Framework, 48 HARV. INT'L L.J. 31 (2007) (reviewing numerous
considerations that support mutual recognition among countries with high, albeit differing, regulatory
standards).
46. Acceptance from Foreign Private Issuers of Financial Statements Prepared in Accordance
with International Financial Reporting Standards without Reconciliation to U.S. GAAP, Securities Act
Release No. 8879, 92 SEC Docket 717 (Dec. 21, 2007). Not only did the SEC eliminate the
reconciliation requirement for foreign issuers whose financial statements are prepared according to IFRS
as issued by the IASB, but qualified this condition to permit issuers to depart from strict adherence to
IFRS on their treatment of fair value and hedge fund accounting that had drawn the disapproval of EU
authorities in response to heavy lobbying by public companies.
47. See Concept Release on Allowing U.S. Issuers to Prepare Financial Statements in
Accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards, Securities Act Release No. 8831, 2007
WL 2404264 (Aug. 14, 2007).
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that all U.S. issuers be required to comply with IFRS.48 Increasingly,
the SEC's regulatory posture on financial reporting issues is one of
accommodation to foreign issuers rather than its historical position of
demanding obeisance to U.S. standards. 49  These developments, and
others, bear testament that technology has made the world smaller and
more integrated for investors and firms seeking capital through public
offerings: U.S.-based investors and issuers invest and raise capital in
foreign markets at an ever-increasing pace; foreign investors acquire
securities in U.S. capital markets; and foreign issuers raise significant
capital through public offerings in the United States. Indeed, the pace of
such transnational investing and offerings is accelerating.5 °
The quest for convergence and mutual recognition go hand-in-hand.
The SEC cannot, and should not, recognize that compliance with another
nation's regulations is sufficient for entry into U.S. markets unless it is
satisfied that the other nation's standards are comparable to U.S.
standards. Mutual recognition therefore flows naturally from a
convergence among regulators on proper standards.
Mutual recognition and fostering convergence is not a divergence
from, but rather a continuation of, the SEC's history of interacting with
regulators around the globe. 51  As the SEC has stated, the beginning
point for the broad application of mutual recognition is a framework that
sets forth the overriding principles by which individual regulatory items
48. See Roadmap for the Potential Use of Financial Statements Prepared in Accordance with
International Financial Reporting Standards by U.S. Issuers, Securities Act Release No. 8982, 94 SEC
Docket 1703 (Nov. 14, 2008).
49. See, e.g., Exemption of Certain Foreign Brokers or Dealers, Exchange Act Release No.
58047, 93 SEC Docket 1663 (June 27, 2008) (proposing a conditional exemption permitting foreign
brokers to represent U.S.-based investors premised on the SEC being satisfied of relative comparability
of regulation by the foreign regulator of the foreign broker or dealer).
50. For a thoughtful review of trends in cross-border offerings and trading, see Howell E.
Jackson & Eric J. Pan, Regulatory Competition In International Securities Markets: Evidence From
Europe (pt. 2), 3 VA. L. & Bus. REV. 207 (2008) (detailing waning interest in U.S. markets by European
Issuers that predated the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 that reflects growing maturity of
European markets and has attracted the willingness of U.S. institutions to trade in a foreign market
rather than ADRs in a U.S. market).
51. See, e.g., Regulation of International Securities Markets, Exchange Act Release No. 6807, 42
SEC Docket 284, (Nov. 14, 1988) (extensive policy statement outlining objectives of securities
regulators working together to develop coordinated international solutions through bilateral and
multilateral relationships). Much of the SEC's interaction with its fellow regulators is through IOSCO.
See generally James R. Doty, The Role of the Securities and Exchange Commission in an
Internationalized Marketplace, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. S77, S83-84 (1992). The SEC, while envisioning
that it has a leadership position, nevertheless humbles itself in carrying out this role by balancing the
quest for investor protection by the need to be responsive to the realities within each marketplace. See
SEC, The SEC's Cooperative Arrangements with Foreign Regulators,
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia-coopfactsheet.htm (May 23, 2008) (summary of numerous
cooperative arrangements with foreign regulators).
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will be considered.52 In setting forth these overriding principles, the
SEC should, as it has in the past, remain true to its mandate of both
protecting investors and strengthening U.S. capital markets. While some
might see these as conflicting goals, the rich history of financial market
regulation in the United States suggests that investor protection provides
attractive venues for capital formation, which has greatly benefited the
investment banking community. Indeed, the competition now faced by
U.S. capital markets is largely due to the SEC's successful preaching of
this message. Competition from other markets is a result of their
becoming more efficient and investor friendly, and not due to
dysfunctional regulation of U.S. markets.53
By continuing its practice of engaging foreign regulators, the SEC's
rich experiences not only inform foreign regulatory efforts, but also
improve global standards. The ultimate prize, for all participants in such
bilateral and multilateral engagements is, and should remain, mutual
recognition on significant regulatory issues. The extent that the United
States benefits from this process depends on the SEC's domestic
regulatory efforts to remain on the forefront of being theoretically and
empirically well-informed; this complements calls for expanded use of
special studies on emerging regulatory issues. For mutual recognition to
prevail as a practicable policy requires policies and practices that
advance the historical objectives of securities regulation, which are
balancing investor protection and assisting the efficient performance of
capital markets.
VI. CONCLUSION
The SEC operates in a more complicated and international world than
when it was formed seventy-five years ago. Its durability and
contribution are the result of strategies outlined above, which were never
envisioned when the agency was created: staffing the agency with
experienced professionals from a broad range of disciplines, undertaking
thoughtful studies of emerging issues, relying on congressional support
on regulatory issues that are politically sensitive, and invoking mutual
52. See SEC, Statement of the European Commission and the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission on Mutual Recognition in Securities Markets (Feb. 1, 2008),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-9.htm. Thus, leading up to the SEC's announcement that it
would permit foreign issuers to use high-quality IFRS reporting without reconciliation to U.S. GAAP,
the SEC set forth a template by which the SEC would work with the Committee of European Securities
Regulators in implementing such convergence. See SEC, SEC and CESR Launch Work Plan Focused
on Financial Reporting (Aug. 2, 2006), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-130.htm.
53. See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text; see also COMM. ON CAPITAL MARKETS
REGULATION, supra note 35, at 4-7.
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recognition as an informed regulatory leader. These past strategies are
as compelling today as they have been throughout the agency's history.
Recognizing and committing to these strategies-not new laws-will
ensure the SEC survives and thrives. The omissions that critics have
laid at the SEC's feet are the result of the SEC's recent failure to steer
closer to its historical methodology of addressing the ever-shifting
forces of U.S. and global capital markets. Omissions become more
significant when regulators lack the appropriate skills to understand the
regulated. Often, policymakers look backwards, rather than inform
themselves through comprehensive studies of emerging issues. They
also defer to globalization forces rather than international diplomacy
when formulating policy. Though the extent to which each of these
have occurred in past years is debatable, this Article argues that the
strategies suggested above were not applied as they should have been.
By pursuing operational strategies that have distinguished it as a premier
agency in the past, the SEC can avoid future charges that a crisis was
partly due to its omissions.
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